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AFRICAN POLYGAMY: PAST AND PRESENT
JAMES FENSKE
ABSTRACT. I use DHS data to test nine hypotheses about the prevalence and decline
of African polygamy. First, greater female involvement in agriculture does not increase
polygamy. Second, past inequality better predicts polygamy today than does current in-
equality. Third, the slave trade only predicts polygamy across broad regions. Fourth,
modern female education does not reduce polygamy. Colonial schooling does. Fifth, eco-
nomic growth has eroded polygamy. Sixth and seventh, rainfall shocks and war increase
polygamy, though their effects are small. Eighth, polygamy varies smoothly over borders,
national bans notwithstanding. Finally, falling child mortality has reduced polygamy.
1. INTRODUCTION
Polygamy and poverty are both widespread in Africa.1 Several mechanisms have been
suggested linking polygamy to slow growth, including low savings rates (Tertilt, 2005),
reduced investment in girls’ human capital (Edlund and Lagerlo¨f, 2006), and diminished
labor supply of unmarried men (Edlund and Lagerlo¨f, 2012). In the “polygamy belt”
stretching from Senegal to Tanzania, it is common for more than one third of married
women to be polygamous (Jacoby, 1995). Excepting Haiti, polygamy is less common
in other developing countries. In all other Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), at
least 92% of married women are reported to be monogamous. This is despite a striking
decline in the prevalence of polygamy in Africa over the last half century. In Benin, more
than 60% of women in the sample used for this study who were married in 1970 are
polygamists, while the figure for those married in 2000 is under 40%. This is also true of
Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Senegal. Several other countries in the data have experienced
similar erosions of polygamy. This is an evolution of marriage markets as dramatic as
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specialists are typically unfamiliar with the term “polygyny.”
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FIGURE 1. Polygamy in Africa
This figure plots polygamy for the women in the sample that have latitude and longitude coordinates. A
red dot indicates polygamy, and a blue dot indicates monogamy.
the rise in divorce in the United States or the decline of arranged marriage in Japan over
the same period.
I use DHS data on 494,157 women from 34 countries to test nine hypotheses about
the geographic distribution of polygamy in sub-Saharan Africa and its decline over time.
These are motivated by a simple model, and by previous theories and findings from eco-
nomics, anthropology, and African history. These hypotheses test whether polygamy
responds to economic incentives, economic shocks, and the process of economic de-
velopment.
I map African polygamy in Figure 1. Each point is a married woman for whom co-
ordinates are available. Red dots indicate polygamists; blue dots are monogamists.
Polygamy is concentrated in West Africa, though a high-intensity belt stretches through
to Tanzania. Polygamy in the data is largely bigamy: 72% of respondents report that
they are the only wife, 19% report that their husband has two wives, 7% report that he
has three wives, and fewer than 2% report that he has 4 wives or more.
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The geographic distribution of polygamy can be accounted for by geographic, his-
torical and cultural variables that are slow to change. First, Jacoby (1995) has linked
the demand for wives in the Ivory Coast to the productivity of women in agriculture. I
find, by contrast, that polygamy is least common in those parts of Africa where women
have historically been most important in agriculture. Second, economists since Becker
(1974) have linked polygamy to inequality between men. I am not able to find any corre-
lation between wealth inequality recorded in the DHS and the probability that a woman
is polygamous. I find, however, that historical inequality predicts polygamy today. Sim-
ilarly, geographic predictors of inequality that have been used in other studies also pre-
dict the existence of polygamy in the present. Third, I confirm the result of Dalton and
Leung (2013); greater slave trade exposure does predict polygamy today. I show, how-
ever, that the result depends on a broad comparison of West Africa to the rest of the
continent.2
I show the decline of polygamy over time in Figure 2. A raw correlation between year
of birth and polygamy will confound time trends with age effects, since a young lone
wife may later become a polygamist’s senior wife. Thus, I estimate the time trend of
polygamy for each country with more than one cross-section. I use the regression:
polygamousi = f(agei) + g(year of birthi) + i.
The functions f and g are quartic. I use the estimated coefficients and survey weights
to calculate the predicted probability that a woman aged 30 is polygamous as a func-
tion of her year of birth. I present these in Figure 2. Though the speed of the decline has
differed across countries, its presence has been almost universal. In the Web Appendix,
I show raw plots of polygamy by age stratified by country and survey year: these tell a
similar story. To my knowledge, this is not a trend that has been documented previ-
ously.3
Understanding the decline in African polygamy requires examining time-varying fac-
tors that may influence polygamy. First, I exploit two natural experiments that have in-
creased female education in Nigeria (Osili and Long, 2008) and Zimbabwe (Agu¨ero and
Ramachandran, 2010), and find no causal effect of women’s schooling on polygamy. By
contrast, I use colonial data from Huillery (2009) and Nunn (2011) to show that school-
ing investments decades ago predict lower polygamy rates today. Second, I find an im-
pact of greater levels income per capita on the decline in polygamy. I follow Miguel
et al. (2004), and use country-level rainfall as an instrumental variable. Third, I find that
local economic shocks predict polygamy; women within a survey cluster who received
unfavorable rainfall draws in their prime marriageable years are more likely to marry a
2I became aware of their paper while working on this project. They were first, but replication is good for
science.
3The data do not permit a similar exercise for men.
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FIGURE 2. Predicted polygamy over time for women aged 30, by year of birth
polygamist. Fourth, war acts like a detrimental rainfall shock at the local level, increas-
ing the prevalence of polygamy. Both of these effects, however, are small in magnitude.
Fifth, I use a regression discontinuity design to test whether national bans and other
country-level efforts have played any role in the decline of African polygamy. With a few
notable exceptions, I find that they have not. Finally, I use national-level differences in
differences and a natural experiment from Uganda to test for an effect of falling child
mortality. The magnitudes I find are large enough to explain a meaningful decline in
polygamy in several African countries.
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To summarize: I find, first, that existing theories of polygamy face challenges in ex-
plaining Africa. Inequality is related to polygamy, but acts over the very long term. The
distribution of polygamy in Africa does not fit an explanation rooted in the gender di-
vision of labor. Educating women in the present does not reduce polygamy. Second,
I find that history matters. Pre-colonial inequality, the slave trade, and colonial edu-
cation matter in the present. Third, African marriage markets have responded to eco-
nomic growth and fluctuations, but the largest elasticities that I find are in response to
changes in child health. These patterns are consistent with other findings that, while
norms and culture respond to economic pressures, they are persistent.
1.1. Relevant literature. My results contribute to our knowledge of the determinants
of ethnic institutions. Institutions such as pre-colonial states and land tenure mat-
ter for modern incomes (Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou,
2013). Although an empirical literature has explained national institutions as products
of influences such as settler mortality, population, trade, or suitability for specific crops,
less is known about the origins of ethnic institutions. Like national institutions, these
may have their basis in biogeographical endowments such as population pressure or
ecologically-driven gains from trade (Fenske, 2013; Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson, 2012).
I add to this literature by testing hypotheses about the origin of one specific ethnic in-
stitution, and by identifying variables that influence its persistence and evolution.
My results also add to our understanding of family structures. Several recent contri-
butions have explained marriage patterns using the gender division of labor created by
influences such as the plough (Alesina et al., 2012), animal husbandry (Voigtla¨nder and
Voth, 2012), natural resource wealth (Ross, 2008), or deep tillage (Carranza, 2012). Other
views link marital rules to risk-sharing arrangements (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989). A
handful of papers model polygamy. In this paper, I reassess some of the most influen-
tial explanations of African polygamy, and propose new contributing factors. I uncover
a dramatic transition in the continent’s marriage markets, and assess some plausible
explanations for this change.
In section 2, I outline the hypotheses that I test. I discuss the literature and simple
model that motivate these. In section 3, I describe the tests that I apply to each of these
hypotheses. I introduce the multiple data sources that I use in section 4. I report the
results in section 5. In section 6, I conclude.
2. HYPOTHESES
In this section, I outline a simple model of polygamy that addresses the hypotheses
that I test empirically. I relate its predictions to existing results in the economic, anthro-
pological, and historical literatures.
2.1. ModelOverview. In the Web Appendix, I present a simple model that motivates my
empirical tests within a unified framework. Not every outcome is novel. For example,
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the link between inequality and polygamy goes back to Becker (1974). This model can-
not explain all stylized facts in the data. Increasing incomes predict greater polygamy in
the model, but less polygamy in the data. The purpose of the model, then, is to demon-
strate that the hypotheses I test are theoretically relevant in a simplified, static frame-
work. Further, I derive predictions that differ from existing explanations of polygamy;
this establishes that there is theoretical ambiguity that must be resolved empirically.
In the basic model, poor men and rich men trade sisters for wives at an endogenously-
determined bride price. Wives work and bear children. Men face a trade-off between
fertility and consumption, and select the costly human capital of their children. The
parameters of the model are chosen to capture insights about the hypotheses I test. ρ
measures female agricultural productivity. θ indicates the degree of inequality between
men. s indicates the ratio of women to men. γL and γH are the costs of raising low-
human-capital and high-human-capital children, respectively. y is the overall level of
income.
Because the model does not allow for non-marriage of women or marital age gaps, the
mean number of wives per man is determined mechanically by the female-male ratio,
s. I use the ratio of wives of a rich man to the number of wives of a poor man as an index
of polygamy. This endogenous outcome is denoted R. The fraction of women who are
married to rich men is increasing in R.
2.2. The geographic distribution of polygamy.
2.2.1. The gender division of labor. Boserup (1970) suggests that accumulating wives
is more profitable for men where women contribute more to agriculture. This is facil-
itated by African land tenure systems that allow growing households to expand their
holdings of land. Empirically, Jacoby (1995) shows that the demand for wives is great-
est in those parts of the Ivory Coast where female productivity in agriculture predicted
by crop mixes is highest. White (1988) finds a positive correlation between polygamy
and female importance in agriculture within the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample. Al-
ternatively, women’s economic roles shape their relative bargaining power, potentially
improving their marital outcomes.
Although women are more important in agriculture where they are more produc-
tive (Alesina et al., 2012), the model does not predict that this will increase polygamy.
Though greater productivity ρ increases the demand for women, supply is held con-
stant. Increasing the productivity of women in agriculture reduces polygamy in the
model (∂R
∂ρ
< 0). The increase in ρ raises the purchasing power of both rich men and
poor men, since their endowments of sisters have both increased in value. This reduces
the disparity in purchasing power and, hence, polygamy.
2.2.2. Inequality. Becker (1974) argues that polygamy can raise total output when men
are unequal. Similarly, Bergstrom (1994) models polygamy as a consequence of in-
equality in male endowments of both wealth and sisters. Empirically, Barber (2008) and
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Kanazawa and Still (1999) both find that polygamy is more common in modern coun-
tries where inequality is greater. White (1988) finds a positive correlation between in-
equality and polygamy within the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample. The model predicts
that inequality increases polygamy. ∂R
∂θ
> 0.
Many perspectives stress that inequality will only permit polygamy under despotic
political institutions; in democratic societies, poorer men will vote to impose monogamy
(Anderson and Tollison, 1998; De la Croix and Mariani, 2012). Similarly, Lagerlo¨f (2010)
suggests that a self-interested ruler may impose monogamy at later stages of develop-
ment to prevent his own overthrow by lesser men deprived of wives. Across societies,
Betzig (1982) finds a positive correlation between hierarchy and polygamy, arguing that
men use positions of authority to increase access to women. Even where marriage has
been monogamous, mating has been polygynous in despotic, unequal societies (Betzig,
1992, 1995).
2.2.3. The slave trade. That the slave trade may have increased polygamy is an old argu-
ment – see Thornton (1983). In addition to its effects on inequality and the female-male
ratio, it created movable wealth that may have facilitated a transition from matrilocal
to patrilocal marriage, allowing non-sororal polygamy to exist (Schneider, 1981). Per-
sistence of polygamy after the end of the slave trade may be due, among other reasons,
to cultural durability, survival of unequal political and economic structures, permanent
changes in the economic role of women, or continuation of unequal sex ratios (Edlund
and Ku, 2011).
Dalton and Leung (2013) test whether the slave trade predicts polygamy in DHS data.
I confirm their result using different methods. I take women as the unit of observation,
rather than men, and match women to slave exports by location in addition to matching
by ethnicity. I show these results are robust to adding Angola, which exported more
slaves than any other country, but has low polygamy rates today. I add the caveat that
the slave trade can only predict polygamy across broad regions.
The slave trade can be thought of in at least two ways in the model. The first is as an
increase in the female-male ratio, s. This will increase the number of wives for rich and
poor men. However, ∂R
∂s
< 0. A larger endowment of sisters for both rich and poor men
will reduce inequality in wives. I show in the Web Appendix that the female-male ratio
helps explain polygamy today by showing that polygamy is is more common in areas
closer to mines, where labor is generally provided by migrant men. A second approach
to the slave trade gives a different result. Because those who profited from the slave
trade did so at the expense of others, it increased inequality (θ). This would increase R.
2.3. The decline of polygamy.
2.3.1. Female education. Empowering women through education may encourage them
to avoid polygamous marriage. Gould et al. (2008) suggest that a rich man intent on in-
creasing child quality will prefer one educated wife to several uneducated ones because
8 JAMES FENSKE
of her comparative advantage in producing high-quality children. If the returns to hu-
man capital rise, and women are heterogeneous in their levels of human capital, this
can provoke a transition to monogamy.
Histories of missionary education exert persistent influence on attitudes towards democ-
racy (Woodberry, 2012) and the position of women (Nunn, 2011); it is possible that these
have had a similar effects on attitudes towards polygamy. These cultural influences are
not captured by the model.
The model gives different predictions. If educating women makes it easier for them to
raise educated children, reducing γH , it will have no effect on polygamy, though it may
induce a switch from low-quality to high-quality children. This differs from the result in
Gould et al. (2008). In their model, educated women have an advantage in producing
educated children, and husbands prefer this benefit to greater fertility. Here, women are
homogenous. The effects of mass education programs like the ones I exploit as natural
experiments will differ from those that have unequal impacts.
2.3.2. Economic growth. The Gould et al. (2008) model is one in which the transition
to monogamy is spurred by the increasing importance of human capital under modern
economic growth. Gould et al. (2012) support this interpretation, correlating polygamy
rates with income sources in the Ivory Coast. Similarly, Lagerlo¨f (2005) models the tran-
sition to greater reproductive equality not as the result of greater incomes per se, but of
the transition to modern growth based on greater returns to human capital.
Contrary to the literature, the model reveals that other mechanisms may counter the
tendency of polygamy to decline with income if there is no change in the returns to
human capital. Here, an increase in y will increase the fraction of wives held by the rich:
∂R
∂y
> 0. The increase in y raises the importance of monetary wealth relative to wealth in
sisters, increasing the advantage of rich men in the marriage market. The distribution
and source of income gains, then, will matter.
2.3.3. Economic shocks. I test whether rainfall shocks at the survey cluster level pre-
dict whether a woman will marry polygamously. Since many African societies pay bride
price, an adverse shock may encourage a girl’s parents to marry her to a worse man in
order to smooth consumption. Even without bride price, this may allow her parents to
remove a dependant or gain ties with another household able to offer support. Since
polygamist men tend be wealthier, they are better able to buy a wife in depressed con-
ditions.
Although I do not include insurance explicitly, the model captures these intuitions. If
poor men see their incomes fall more than richer men, this will act like an increase in θ,
increasing R. If, instead, incomes fall generally, this decline in y will reduce the extent
of polygamy.
2.3.4. War. Warfare might increase polygamy for several reasons. The sex ratio is an
obvious channel; Becker (1974) cites a nineteenth-century war that killed much of the
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male population of Paraguay and was followed by a rise in polygamy. The BBC has sug-
gested that polygamy is a coping strategy for war widows in Iraq,4 while the OECD has
made similar claims about Angola.5 Historically, warfare has existed as a means for cap-
turing women from neighboring ethnic groups (White and Burton, 1988). In the model,
war would be expected to operate through the same channels as a local economic shock,
as well as by increasing s, the female-male ratio.
2.3.5. National policies. Polygamy was banned by law in the Ivory Coast in 1964, but
remains widespread there. Despite the apparent failure of similar bans in other coun-
tries, it is possible that other policies that vary at the national level may have affected
polygamy. These could include democratization, the legal status of women, or the pro-
vision of health and education.
I use a regression discontinuity design to test whether polygamy rates break at the
borders in my sample. Other studies of Africa have found that government investments
such as education and health have effects that change discontinuously across national
borders. By contrast, indigenous institutions such as rights over land pass smoothly
over national borders (Bubb, 2013).
The model suggests that only some policies will matter. For example, some countries
might provide better education, lowering γH , but having no effect on polygamy. Alterna-
tively, countries with national bans that increase the costs of polygamy could be seen as
levying a fine on wives greater than s. This would have the effect of dampening demand
for wives from richer men, reducing bride-price and relative polygamy R.
2.3.6. Child mortality. Most economic models of polygamy consider it as a means for
men to achieve greater fertility. Empirically, Grossbard-Shechtman (1986) estimates
that two thirds of the demand for wives in Maiduguri is, in fact, demand for children.
Barber (2008) finds polygamy and pathogen stress are positively correlated across coun-
tries.
In the model, child mortality could be seen as an increase in γL and γH , the costs
of children. In the baseline setup, child mortality will change fertility, but not the to-
tal number of wives. This follows from the assumptions on preferences; a simplified
model with quasilinear utility gives the result that greater levels of child mortality in-
crease polygamy if the extent of inequality is not too great. This follows a simple intu-
ition; if polygamy is a mechanism for men to increase their fertility, a reduction in the
probability that any one child will die reduces number of wives needed to achieve a tar-
get number of surviving children. Whether this occurs in practice will depend on the
magnitudes of the income and substitution effects.
2.4. Other views. Space and data availability force me to ignore some plausible expla-
nations of polygamy and its decline. These include exposure to pair-bonding hormones
4http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12266986
5http://genderindex.org/country/angola
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through animal husbandry (Adshade and Kaiser, 2008), son-preference (Milazzo, 2012),
abundance of land (Goody, 1973, 1976), and assortative matching (Siow, 2006). I discuss
other possible determinants of polygamy, such as religion and urbanization, in Appen-
dix A and in the Web Appendix. In the Web Appendix, I present the correlates of historic
polygamy across the ethnic groups recorded in the Murdock (1967) Ethnographic Atlas.
3. TESTS
The econometric tests that I use to test these hypotheses vary according to whether
the potential cause of polygamy is time-invariant, varies over time, can be tested with a
regression discontinuity, or can be tested using a natural experiment.
3.1. The geographic distribution of polygamy. Several hypotheses suggest effects of
time-invariant variables on polygamy. Historical inequality is one example. For hy-
potheses of this type, my basic specification is:
(1) polygamousi = z
′
iβ + x
′
iγ + δCR + i.
Here, polygamousi is an indicator for whether woman i is in a polygamous marriage.
zi is the vector of controls of interest – for example her ethnic group’s gender division
of labor, or her survey cluster’s suitabilities for growing certain crops. xi is a vector of
individual and geographic controls. δCR is a country-round fixed effect; this will absorb
both country and survey-year fixed effects. i is error. Standard errors are clustered at
the level at which the variables of interest (zi) vary. I use ordinary least squares (OLS) to
estimate (1). Where I have instruments for zi, I use instrumental variables (IV).
The variables that are available to include in xi differ across the 90 DHS data sets that
I compile, and so I use only a limited set of individual-level controls. These are: year
of birth, year of birth squared, age, age squared, dummies for religion, and urban. I am
able to include both year of birth and age because the DHS surveys were conducted in
multiple years, though the linear term disappears with country-round fixed effects.
I include geographic controls in xi to capture other determinants of polygamy that
may be correlated with zi. These are: absolute latitude; suitability for rain-fed agricul-
ture; malaria endemism; ruggedness; elevation; distance to the coast, and dummies
for ecological zone (woodland, forest, mosaic, cropland, intensive cropland, wetland,
desert, water/coastal fringe, or urban).
3.1.1. The gender division of labor. I use two separate measures of the gender division
of labor in zi. The first is the historic degree of female participation in agriculture. The
second is the suitability of the woman’s survey cluster for growing specific crops. I then
use these suitability measures as instruments for the historic importance of women in
agriculture. The exclusion restriction is that the relative productivity of different crops
influences polygamy only through the gender division of labor and is not correlated with
unobserved determinants of polygamy. Note that agricultural productivity in general is
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included as a separate regressor, and is not excluded from the second stage. This is
similar to the restriction in Jacoby (1995).
3.1.2. Inequality. When I test for the importance of contemporary inequality, I use the
coefficient of variation of household wealth in zi.
6 I compute this within both survey
clusters and sub-national regions. Because the wealth measures come normalized for
each country-round, these results are only interpretable when country-round fixed ef-
fects are included. I also use historic class stratification, a measure of historical inequal-
ity, in zi.
I also use geographic variables in zi that have been treated by other studies as predic-
tors of inequality. These are the log ratio of wheat to sugar suitability and heterogeneity
in land quality. The mechanism behind the log ratio of wheat to sugar suitability was
proposed by Engerman and Sokoloff (1997). Sugar production in the Americas was de-
pendent on slave labor, while wheat production was amenable to family farms. The
long-run result was more inequality in regions that grew sugar. Easterly (2007) finds
the log suitability ratio predicts inequality even outside the Americas, which suggests
that suitability for sugarcane predicts inequality-increasing agricultural practices even
where it is not grown. Heterogeneity in land quality is more intuitive; when there is in-
equality in the ability to produce income, outcomes should be unequal. Michalopoulos
et al. (2012) use this measure in explaining the rise of Islam. First-stage F statistics are
too weak to permit using these geographic variables as instruments for inequality. I can,
then, only offer a guarded interpretation; historical inequality or unobservable variables
that are correlated with ethnic institutions shape polygamy today.7
3.1.3. The slave trade. I use measures of ethnicity-level slave exports in zi, clustering
standard errors by ethnicity. I instrument for slave exports using distance of the survey
cluster from the closest slave port in the Americas. When country-round fixed effects are
included, this instrument loses predictive power. Thus, I follow Nunn and Wantchekon
(2011) and use distance from the coast as an alternative instrument. To demonstrate
that the results depend on a broad comparison of West Africa and the rest of the conti-
nent, I show that including longitude in xi eliminates the effect, as does re-estimating
this regression on the sub-sample of West African countries.8 Because my main data
source and that of Dalton and Leung (2013) both exclude Angola (the polygamy ques-
tion was not asked), I assemble alternative data using the DHS “household recodes.” I
code each household as polygamous if more than one woman is listed as a wife of the
6I show in the Web Appendix that the results are similar if a Gini coefficient is used.
7Other approaches to predicting inequality, such as unequal landholding (Dutt and Mitra, 2008), inequal-
ity in immigrants’ home countries (Putterman and Weil, 2010), or changes over time in relative prices of
“plantation” and “smallholder” crops (Galor et al., 2009) cannot be applied to these data.
8Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, and Togo.
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household head. Individual controls are missing from these data, and so I only use geo-
graphic controls.
3.2. The decline of polygamy.
3.2.1. Female education. To test whether expanded access to education has reduced
polygamy in Africa, I exploit two recent natural experiments and spatial variation in
access to colonial education.
School-building in Nigeria. From 1976 to 1981, the Nigerian government engaged in a
school-building program in certain states. Osili and Long (2008) use this to test whether
female schooling reduces fertility. I follow their approach, and use OLS to estimate:
polygamyi = βBorn 1970-75 X Intensityi
+ αIntensityi + λBorn 1970-75+ x
′
iγ + i
Intensityi will, in different specifications, measure either whether the respondent’s
state was treated by the program, or spending per capita in the state. The controls in xi
match Osili and Long (2008). These are year of birth, dummies for the three largest Nige-
rian ethnic groups (Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo), and dummies for the major religions (Muslim,
Catholic, Protestant, other Christian, and traditional). The sample includes only women
born between 1956-61 and 1970-75. This tests whether the school-building program
had a differential effect on the women young enough to be exposed to it as children in
the affected states. β is the treatment effect. Standard errors are clustered by the states
that existed in 1976.
The end of white rule in Zimbabwe. The end of white rule in Zimbabwe increased
access to education for students who were 14 or younger in 1980. Agu¨ero and Ra-
machandran (2010) test for intergenerational effects of this education shock. Agu¨ero
and Bharadwaj (2012) examine the impacts on knowledge of HIV. Following these, I use
OLS to estimate:
polygamyi = βAge 14 or below in 1980i + αAge in 1980i
+ λ(14-Age in 1980) X (Age 14 or below in 1980)+ i
Like Agu¨ero and Ramachandran (2010), I do not include additional controls and I use
robust standard errors. The “full” sample includes women aged 6 to 22 in 1980, and the
“short” sample includes women aged 10 to 20 in that year. β measures the effect of the
change.
I show in the Web Appendix that a similar natural experiment from Sierra Leone (Can-
nonier and Mocan, 2012) did not reduce polygamy. As with the colonial schooling in-
vestments, the data I use cover women, and so cannot be used to evaluate whether these
modern schooling interventions altered the relative levels of schooling across genders.
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Colonial education. First, I follow Huillery (2009) and include the average number of
teachers per capita at the district (cercle) level in colonial French West Africa over the
period 1910-1928 in zi. I modify xi so that it matches the controls used by Huillery (2009)
as closely as possible. I always include the respondent’s year of birth, year squared,
age, age squared, dummies for religion and the urban dummy. In successive columns,
I include measures of the attractiveness of the district to the French, conditions of its
conquest, pre-colonial conditions, and geographic variables in xi. Standard errors are
clustered by 1925 district.
Second, I follow Nunn (2011) and include distance from a Catholic or Protestant mis-
sion in 1924 in zi.
9 Since much colonial education was conducted through missions,
this captures the combined effects of schooling and evangelism. Standard errors are
clustered by survey cluster.
The data I use cover women, and so do not reveal how colonial education affected
the relative education levels of women and men. Because I do not have instruments
for these historical variables, it is not possible to interpret these estimates as strictly
causal. Indeed, geographic controls do predict the location of colonial missions (not
reported). Supporting a causal interpretation, ethnicities recorded in the Ethnographic
Atlas that practiced polygamy received more missions per unit area (not reported). The
significant estimates I find are, however, consistent with the importance of history in
explaining polygamy.
3.2.2. Economic growth. The data come as cross-sections of women born in different
years. This allows me to use variation in the ages at which women were exposed to
shocks such as drought, war, or economic growth to test for time-varying causes of
polygamy. For hypotheses of this type, my basic specification is:
(2) polygamousi = z
′
iβ + x
′
iγ + δj + ηt + i.
The variablespolygamousi, xi, and i are the same as above. zi now measures a woman’s
exposure to a shock around the time she is most marriageable. I measure shocks at the
woman’s age of marriage and, because this is potentially endogenous, averaged over her
early adolescence (ages 12 to 16). δj is a fixed effect for the woman’s survey cluster. ηt
is a fixed effect for time – t is the year of marriage when zt is measured at the age of
marriage, and t is the year of birth when zt is measured over the ages 12 to 16. I am
comparing women across cohorts in the same survey cluster in order to identify β.
Because δj is collinear with geographic controls and the urban dummy, these con-
trols are dropped. This prevents the use of (2) to test hypotheses such as the gender
division of labor, inequality, and the slave trade in which geographic variables matter.
9Results are similar if dummy variables for whether a colonial mission exists within 5, 10, 15 or 20 km are
used in zi, although the correlation between polygamy and distance from a Protestant mission becomes
more robust (not reported).
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ηt is collinear with year of birth and the combination of ηt and δj are collinear with age
when the shock is averaged over a woman’s adolescence. Thus, xi only contains dum-
mies for religion in that specification. I use OLS or IV to estimate (2). Because the data
are at the individual level, I am not able to include lagged polygamy. Standard errors are
clustered at the level at which zi varies.
To test for an impact of economic growth, I include log GDP per capita in zt. Standard
errors are clustered by country × year of marriage (or year of birth). I instrument for
country-level GDP per capita using the country-level rainfall estimates used by Miguel
et al. (2004). Standard errors are clustered by country-round in the IV estimation.
3.2.3. Economic shocks. I include rainfall shocks in the woman’s survey cluster in zt.
Standard errors are clustered by cluster× year of marriage or cluster× year of birth.
3.2.4. War. I include the number of battle deaths in a conflict whose radius includes a
woman’s survey cluster in zt. I treat this as a proxy for conflict intensity. Standard errors
are clustered by cluster× year of marriage or year of birth.
3.2.5. National policies. For each neighboring set of countries in the data, I select all
clusters that are within 100 km of the border and estimate:
(3) polygamyi = β0 + β1Countryi + f(Distancei) + Countryi × f(Distancei) + x′iγ + i
I adopt the convention that Countryc is a dummy for the alphabetically prior country.
f(Distancei) is a cubic in distance from the border. Because of the small sample size and
inclusion of a spatial polynomial, I exclude the geographic controls from xi. I cluster
standard errors by survey cluster.
3.2.6. Child mortality. I include (separately) country-level and sub-national measures
of under-5 mortality mortality in zt. Standard errors are clustered by country × year of
marriage or year of birth. It is possible that polygamy increases child mortality (Strass-
mann, 1997). Here, however, child mortality is measured at or before the time these
women are married and so precedes their fertility decisions.
The eradication of malaria in Kigezi. In 1960, a joint program between the WHO and
the Government of Uganda eradicated malaria in the country’s Kigezi region. Following
Barofsky et al. (2011), I estimate the effect of this program with the regression:
polygamyi = βPosti × Kigezii + x′iγ + δj + ηt + i
Here, Posti measures whether the respondent was born in 1960 or later, Kigezii is a
dummy for the treated region. δj is a district fixed effect, and ηt is a year-of-birth fixed
effect. xi includes dummies for religion, ethnicity and urban. Standard errors are clus-
tered by district. I use this to test for an impact of child mortality on polygamy. There
are two caveats. First, none of the women in the sample are old enough for treatment
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to be measured relative to their year of marriage, rather than their year of birth. Sec-
ond, malaria eradication had several effects; Barofsky et al. (2011), for example, find
educational impacts. My results can only provide indirect support for the importance
of a reduction in child mortality. This is, however, the only anti-malaria campaign I am
aware of that overlaps with data on polygamy. The Kenyan anti-malaria efforts studied
by Pathania (2011) began in 2004, and so it is still too early to evaluate that program’s
effects on marriage outcomes.
4. DATA
In this section, I introduce my sources of data. I provide additional details in the Web
Appendix.
4.1. Dependent variables and controls. Data are taken from the “individual recode”
sections of 90 DHS surveys conducted in 34 sub-Saharan countries between 1986 and
2009. These individual-level samples are nationally representative cross-sections of
ever-married women of childbearing age. From these surveys, 494,157 observations
are available in which a woman’s polygamy status, year of birth, and urban residence
are known. A woman is coded as polygamous if she reports that her husband has more
than one wife. Latitude and longitude coordinates of the respondent’s survey cluster are
known for 301,183 of these observations.10 Year of birth, year of birth squared, age, age
squared, dummies for religion, and urban are taken from these surveys.
Geographic controls are collected from several sources. For each of these, I assign
a survey cluster the value of the nearest raster point. I obtain suitability for rain-fed
agriculture and ecological zone from the Food and Agriculture Organization’s Global
Agro-Ecological Zones (FAO-GAEZ) project. The ecological zones are dummy variables,
while the suitability measure ranges from 0 to 7. Elevation is an index that ranges from
0 to 255, taken from the North American Cartographic Information Society. Malaria en-
demism is from the Malaria Atlas Project, and ranges from 0 to 1. Ruggedness is the Ter-
rain Ruggedness Index used by Nunn and Puga (2012), which ranges from 0 to 1,368,318.
Absolute latitude and distance from the coast are computed directly from the cluster’s
coordinates. The women for whom geographic coordinates are available differ from the
full sample. They were generally born and married later, and are slightly more polyga-
mous (see the Web Appendix). This will only influence the estimation results if there are
heterogeneous treatment effects.
Other variables are specific to each hypothesis, and are described in greater detail
in the Web Appendix. Summary statistics are in Table 1. Because these variables come
from multiple sources, they are each available only for subsets of the data. Sample sizes,
then, differ across columns in the regression tables.
10Recent DHS surveys add noise to these coordinates. Because this displaces 99% of clusters less than
5 km and keeps them within national boundaries, this adds only measurement error to the geographic
controls.
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4.2. The geographic distribution of polygamy.
4.2.1. The gender division of labor. The suitability measures for specific crops are scores
between 0 and 7, published by the FAO. These vary by survey cluster. These are available
for wheat, maize, cereals, roots/tubers, pulses, sugar, oil crops, and cotton. Though
chosen for their availability, these crops are important in the countries in the data. For
example, they accounted for 83% of the value of crop production in Zambia and 91% in
Namibia in 2000 (faostat.fao.org).
Historic female participation in agriculture is taken from the Ethnographic Atlas. This
source reports the ethnic institutions of 1,267 global societies, approximately at the time
of European contact. I join these to the DHS data using respondents’ ethnic groups.
More than 40% of the sample could be assigned a level of “historic female agriculture” by
this method. The polygyny rate for this sample is roughly 10 percentage points greater
than for the unmatched sample. This sample differs along other observable dimensions,
though these differences are small (see the Web Appendix). “Historic female agricul-
ture” assigns each ethnic group a score between 1 and 5 indicating the degree to which
women were important relative to men in agriculture.
4.2.2. Inequality. I use the wealth index from the DHS to measure inequality. This is
a factor score computed separately for every survey round, based on household own-
ership of durable goods. I compute coefficients of variation and Gini coefficients from
these data, measuring inequality across households within the survey cluster or sub-
national region. Although it would be preferable to measure inequality across individ-
uals, ownership of durable goods is only available by household. I do not have data on
ownership of productive assets, such as land.
I take “historic class stratification” from the Ethnographic Atlas. This is a score be-
tween 1 and 5 describing the extent of class differences just prior to colonial rule. The
sample for which this is non-missing is similar to the sample for which “historic female
agriculture” is available.
The log ratio of wheat to sugar suitability is computed directly from the FAO data.
Heterogeneity in land quality is the coefficient of variation of constraints on rain-fed
agriculture for the survey clusters within each region. The constraints variable is an
index between 1 and 7. It measures the combination of soil, climate, and terrain slope
constraints. It also comes from the FAO. These measures have the additional advantage
of being independent of household composition.
4.2.3. The slave trade. I match women in the sample to slave trade estimates from Nunn
and Wantchekon (2011) using self-declared ethnicity. The estimates are reported on a
map, allowing me to use respondents’ geographic coordinates to create an alternative
spatial measure of slave trade intensity. Since it is easier to measure slave exports across
ports than across ethnicities, this will reduce measurement error. Further, the long-run
effects of the slave trade may have worked through institutions that vary by location,
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rather than by ethnicity. Following Dalton and Leung (2013), I use the log of (one plus)
Atlantic slave trade exports normalized by area to measure slave trade exposure.
4.3. The decline of polygamy.
4.3.1. Female education. Years of schooling are reported in the DHS data. I use three
measures of Nigeria’s school building program from Osili and Long (2008): a dummy for
a “high intensity” state, school-building funds in 1976 divided by the 1953 census popu-
lation estimates, and school-building funds normalized by (unreliable) 1976 population
projections. I match survey clusters to the old states using their coordinates. Since the
1999 Nigerian DHS do not report coordinates, I do not use this wave.
Teachers per capita and other controls from colonial French West Africa from Huillery
(2009) are available on her website. Locations of colonial missions from Nunn (2011)
(originally from Roome (1924)) are available on his website.
4.3.2. Economic growth. GDP per capita is from the World Development Indicators.
Rainfall measures from the Miguel et al. (2004) data set average precipitation over ge-
ographic points in a country during a given year, measured by the Global Precipitation
Climatology Project.
4.3.3. Economic shocks. Rainfall shocks taken from a University of Delaware series that
reports annual rainfall on a latitude/longitude grid. Each cluster is joined to the nearest
grid point. I measure shocks as the ratio of rainfall in year t to average rainfall for that
cluster.
4.3.4. War. I take battle deaths from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset. Each con-
flict has a latitude/longitude coordinate, a radius, and a best estimate of the number of
battle deaths during each year of fighting. If a war’s radius overlaps a woman’s survey
cluster in her marriageable years, she is “treated” by these battle deaths.
4.3.5. National policies. Distance to each national border is computed by calculating
the minimum distance between a survey cluster and a pixelated border map.
4.3.6. Child mortaltiy. Child mortality (under 5) is taken from the World Development
Indicators. Because it is only reported every five years, it is interpolated linearly by
country. In the Web Appendix, I show that alternative measures taken from the Insti-
tute for Health Metrics and Evaluation or computed directly from DHS birth histories
give similar results.
For Uganda, “Kigezi” is a dummy for whether the respondent’s survey cluster is in Ka-
bale, Kanungu, Kisoro or Rukungiri. In addition to the DHS sample, I use the 1991 Ugan-
dan census, available through IPUMS. Because polygamy is only reported for household
heads in the census, I limit my sample to wives of household heads when using IPUMS
data.
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5. RESULTS
In this section, I present the results of the tests outlined above. Additional robustness
checks and supporting results are listed in in Appendix A and are described in detail in
the Web Appendix.
5.1. The geographic distribution of polygamy.
5.1.1. The gender division of labor. I show in Table 2 that the distribution of polygamy
within Africa is inconsistent with Jacoby’s (1995) results. The variables that predict fe-
male productivity in his sample do not predict polygamy here. Roots and tubers (the
equivalent of yams and sweet potatoes) have a negative impact on polygamy (columns
1 and 2). His negative coefficient on maize is not found here.
Polygamy and the historical importance of women in agriculture are negatively cor-
related (columns 3 and 5). Polygamy is concentrated in the Sahel and Sudan regions
where women have been less important in agriculture than in more tropical parts of
Africa. Additional controls (in particular, religion), lead this result to become insignif-
icant across countries, though it remains significant within countries (columns 4 and
6). The correlations are moderate; a one standard deviation increase in historic female
agriculture reduces polygamy by roughly 3 percentage points in the most conservative
specification (column 4). To test whether the correlation varies by land scarcity, I in-
clude population density and its interaction with historic female agriculture. The inter-
action is not significant (not reported). The result is not driven by the plough, as the
estimates are nearly identical when the only African country with an indigenous plough
– Ethiopia – is removed (not reported).
The IV results are larger than the OLS estimates (columns 9 and 10). More severe mea-
surement error in the historic division of labor than in contemporary geographic condi-
tions is one explanation. It is also possible that crop suitability cannot be excluded from
the second stage. Indeed, conventional over-identification tests fail on these data. Still,
the hypothesis that the gender division of labor in agriculture determines polygamy
cannot explain why polygamy is most prevalent in those parts of Africa where female
labor in agriculture has historically been least important, even when this is predicted by
fixed geographic factors.11
Why do my results differ from those of Jacoby (1995)? I show in the Web Appendix that
my results hold even within the Ivory Coast. The hypothesis that a greater importance of
women in agriculture leads to polygamy ignores general equilibrium effects captured by
the model in section 2. In addition, a greater role for women may enhance their ability
to negotiate improved marital outcomes.
11The first-stage F-statistics are low because I treat all suitability measures as instruments. The first stage
is reported in columns 7 and 8. If I select only those with the most predictive power, the first-stage F-
statistics improve without qualitatively changing the results.
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5.1.2. Inequality. In Table 3, I show that there is no large positive relationship between
present-day wealth inequality and polygamy (columns 1 to 4). In the one specification
where the correlation is statistically significant, the point estimate is very small. His-
toric class stratification, by contrast, predicts polygamy today (columns 5 to 7). The
geographic predictors of inequality also predict polygamy, further suggesting that the
long-term determinants of inequality matter. The wheat-sugar ratio is significant across
specifications (columns 8 to 10). Greater intra-regional differences in land quality pre-
dict higher levels of polygamy, though this is not robust to the inclusion of other controls
unless country-round fixed-effects are also included (columns 11 to 13).
The magnitudes of the effects vary. A one standard deviation reduction in historical
class stratification would raise polygamy by a bit more than 2 percentage points. This is
not negligible, but is not large enough to explain a substantial fraction of the variance
in polygamy. A one standard deviation movement in the log wheat-sugar ratio is asso-
ciated with a roughly 3 percentage point reduction in polygamy rates (column 9), while
the comparable effect for unequal land quality is a bit larger than 1 percentage point
with controls (column 13).
The data do not make it possible to identify the mechanisms that allow past inequal-
ity to better explain polygamy today than present-day inequality. I do not, for example,
have data on hypergamy. There are at least two likely explanations. First, the basis of
inequality in African societies has changed; current inequality and past class stratifica-
tion have a correlation coefficient less than 0.01. Whereas inequality in the past was
based largely on “wealth in people” (Guyer, 1993), inequality today depends more on
factors such as human capital that are not complemented by polygamy. Supporting this
interpretation, Lagerlo¨f (2010) argues that greater inequality leads to polygamy only in
earlier stages of development. Second, institutions and culture are slow to evolve. Other
results below confirm the importance of historical variables and the small elasticities of
polygamy with respect to present-day shocks.
5.1.3. The slave trade. In Table 4, I find a positive correlation between the slave trade
and current-day polygamy. This is true in both individual-level and household-level
data. It is more robust when respondents are matched to treatment by location (columns
1, 2, 12, and 13) rather than by ethnic group (columns 6, 7, 17 and 18). In the individual-
level OLS, a one standard deviation increase in slave exports predicts a 2 percentage
point increase in polygamy (column 2). The IV results are more than 10 times as large
(column 13). This is consistent with more severe measurement error in slave exports
than in geographic location.
This effect depends, however, on the comparison of West Africa with the rest of the
continent. I use Table 4 to show that country fixed effects (column 3), controlling for
longitude (column 4), and separately estimating the effects using only the West African
sub-sample (column 5) do not yield significant positive results. The hypothesis that the
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slave trade increased polygamy in Africa is supported, but the fineness of the variation
that can be used to identify the effect should not be overstated.
5.2. The decline of polygamy.
5.2.1. Female education. I show in Table 5 that the educational expansions in Nigeria
and Zimbabwe do not predict discontinuous drops in polygamy. In the Web Appendix,
I show that these results are consistent with the small (though statistically robust) cor-
relation between years of education and polygamy in observational data. I do find a
negative effect of schooling in colonial French West Africa on polygamy today in Table
6. A one standard deviation increase in colonial education reduces polygamy by roughly
1 percentage point (column 1).12 While I find that proximity to a historical Catholic mis-
sion reduces polygamy today, the similar effect of distance from a protestant mission
disappears once country-round or region-round fixed effects are added. A one standard
deviation increase in access to a Catholic mission reduces polygamy by roughly 3 per-
centage points with the tightest fixed effects (column 9). I find no evidence that Catholic
missions better predict polygamy in colonies of Catholic countries, or where Protestant
missions are more distant (not reported).
The lack of an impact for modern education is similar to the finding in Friedman et al.
(2011) that educating women does not create “modern” attitudes. The historical results
are consistent with the findings in Nunn (2011) that Catholic missions imparted both
education and ideologies about the role of women. These results suggest that education
only reduces polygamy rates over the long term and in conjunction with other interven-
tions. While colonial schooling was largely performed by missionaries, for whom the
sanctity of Christian marriage was an overarching concern (e.g. Chanock (1985)), this is
not true of modern education.
If historical schools proxy for parental education, it could explain these results. This
information is not in the DHS data, and so I use other sources to test whether parental
education predicts polygamy. I show in the Web Appendix that mother’s education does
not predict polygamy in World Bank surveys from Nigeria, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast.
Daughters of more educated fathers are less likely to be polygamous in Nigeria and the
Ivory Coast, and the negative correlations between own education and polygamy are
significant only in the Ivory Coast.
5.2.2. Economic growth. I show in Table 7 that higher levels of GDP per capita dur-
ing a woman’s marriageable years predict that she is less likely to marry a polygamist
(columns 1, 2, 6 and 7). The estimated coefficients are, however, small. A 100% in-
crease in GDP per capita would reduce polygamy by roughly 2 percentage points in the
unconditional OLS specifications (column 1). This rises to roughly 20 points in the IV
(column 2), which is consistent with the overall poor quality of African national income
12There is a negative correlation between polygamy today and health workers in the past, but this is not
robust to additional controls.
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accounts (Jerven, 2010). If standard errors are clustered by country, the result remains
significant at the 5% level in the IV specifications, but is no longer significant in the OLS
(not reported). While economic growth has been uneven and halting, most countries
in the sample have seen a steady decline in polygamy, even if this has been faster when
growth has accelerated.
5.2.3. Economic shocks. In Table 7, a positive rainfall shock in a woman’s marriageable
years predicts that she is less likely to marry polygamously. These effects are small. Rais-
ing rainfall by 100% over its normal value would only have a roughly 3 percentage point
effect on polygamy (Columns 3 and 8).13 If standard errors are clustered by survey clus-
ter, the result remains significant at the 1% level in both specifications (not reported).
5.2.4. War. In Table 7, war increases polygamy. This is marginally insignificant when
measured at the year of marriage (column 4), though it is robust when averaged over
early adolescence (column 9), and becomes larger and more significant if rainfall shocks
are also included (see the Web Appendix). If standard errors are clustered by survey
cluster, the result remains significant at the 1% level in the ages-12-to-16 specification
(not reported). Although I take war as a random shock, I am unable to rule out the
possibility that war operates through intermediate channels or that unobserved shocks
cause both war and polygamy. The effects are again small. A war with one million battle
deaths would, depending on the specification, raise a woman’s probability of marrying
polygamously by between 25 and 100 percentage points. On average, a woman receives
a much smaller shock closer to 7,000 battle deaths in her year of marriage in the event
she is affected by a war.
5.2.5. National borders. I report regression discontinuities in Table 8. Most borders do
not bring significant discontinuous changes in polygamy rates. Of the seven excep-
tions, two can be immediately discarded; too few clusters were surveyed near the Benin-
Burkina Faso (Column 1) and CAR-DRC (column 11) borders for the polynomial to be
estimated accurately. Similarly, the Cameroon-Nigeria (column 12) and Niger-Nigeria
(column 36) discontinuities are driven by outliers near the border, and disappear with
either a linear or quadratic distance polynomial.
The remaining three breaks are large. There is no obvious mechanism that explains
the discontinuities at CAR-Cameroon (column 10), Ivory Coast-Liberia (column 24),
and Malawi-Tanzania (column 29) borders. While Bubb (2013) finds discontinuities
indicating higher levels of education and numeracy in Ghana than in the Ivory Coast,
education cannot explain the outcomes. I add years of schooling as a control; this has
only a modest effect on the magnitudes (not reported).
13Because rainfall may be mean-reverting, I also allow rainfall to enter separately for each year between
ages 12 and 16 (not reported). The coefficients are negative, but significant only at age 16. Interacting
these shocks with the gender division of labor shows their effect to be largest where women are most
important in agriculture (not reported).
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5.2.6. Child mortality. The difference-in-difference estimates in Table 7 suggest that
the effect of child mortality on polygamy is sizable. These results suggest an elastic-
ity of at least 0.7 (column 5). The magnitudes are similar if I use alternative estimates
from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, and are roughly 40% as large if I
use sub-national region-specific estimates computed from the raw DHS data (see the
Web Appendix). Using these DHS-based estimates, the magnitudes are similar using
the mortality of boys or girls (not reported). In a country such as Nigeria, where under-5
mortality has fallen from more than 28% in the early 1960s to roughly 14% today, this is
enough to explain a roughly 4 to 10 percentage point drop in polygamy rates over the
period. I show in the Web Appendix that this is robust to including GDP per capita as
a control. Similarly, this result survives controlling for country-level fertility rates (not
reported). If standard errors are clustered by country, the result remains significant at
the 5% level in the age-of-marriage specification and the 1% level in the ages-12-to-16
specification (not reported).
The results for Uganda provide suggestive evidence of causation. The DHS data show
that women born after the malaria eradication program in the treatment area were
roughly 7 percentage points less likely to marry polygamously (column 1). The IPUMS
data give a smaller effect, equal to less than 1 percentage point (column 2), reflecting
the lower polygamy rate for wives of household heads in the IPUMS data (11%) than all
ever-married women in the DHS (31%).
Several other facts support the interpretation that polygamy is a strategy for men to
increase their fertility, which would explain this result. Marriage of older women is rare;
95% of polygamist women began their most recent marriage no later than age 27.14 In-
teracting child mortality with the wealth index suggests the effect is largest for wealthier
households (not reported). In the Web Appendix, I show that first wives whose first child
dies are more likely to become polygamists, though I do not find an effect of child gen-
der or twinning. Similarly, Milazzo (2012) has found that desired fertility leads Nigerian
men to seek additional wives if their first wives do not have children; see also Wagner
and Rieger (2011). I also show in the Web Appendix that controlling for pathogen stress
in a sample of pre-industrial societies substantially reduces the unexplained gap be-
tween polygamy in Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world. Pathogen stress itself
positively predicts polygamy.
6. CONCLUSION
I have tested several influential theories of polygamy, and none have passed cleanly.
Polygamy rates in the present are more related to inequality and female education in
the past than they are to these variables today. The relative distribution of polygamy in
Africa cannot be explained by the traditional gender division of labor. The slave trade
14The duration of the respondent’s current marriage is reported in bins such as “15-19 years.” The maxi-
mum age at most recent marriage is current age minus the minimum value in this bin.
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remains a plausible explanation. However, this is indistinguishable from the fact that
polygamy rates are higher in West Africa. Similarly, national policies appear not to have
mattered. While polygamy responds to rainfall shocks and war, the magnitude of these
effects is too small to play an important role in polygamy’s decline in Africa.
Because many variables I use are only available for non-overlapping sub-samples of
the data and the econometric specifications that I use cannot be synthesized into a sin-
gle regression or decomposition, the significant results that I do find are best compared
using standardized coefficients. One standard deviation increases in historic inequal-
ity or its geographic predictors raise polygamy by 2 to 3 percentage points. Historical
schools and missions have similar standardized effects between 1 and 3 percentage
points. A one standard deviation reduction in child mortality has a larger effect, a bit
over 5 percentage points. The effects of the slave trade and economic growth are less
precisely measured; a one standard deviation decrease in slave exports or a 100% in-
crease in economic growth is expected to reduce polygamy between 2 and 20 percent-
age points, depending on whether OLS or IV estimates are used. While I have uncovered
some economically important determinants of polygamy, none of these can explain the
bulk of polygamy’s prevalence or disappearance.
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APPENDIX A. ROBUSTNESS AND ADDITIONAL HYPOTHESES
The following robustness checks are detailed in the Web Appendix.
A.1. Additional summary statistics and observable characteristics by sub-sample. 1)
Observable characteristics of the sample of polygamists differ from those of the sample
of non- polygamists. 2) Observable characteristics of the sample for which the historic
importance of women in agriculture is missing differ from those of the sample for which
it is non-missing. I show similar comparisons for the sub-samples with non-missing
historic class stratification and geographic coordinates. 3) I provide summary statistics
on the distribution of respondents’ husbands’ total number of wives, and respondents’
ranks as wives.
A.2. Thegenderdivisionof labor. 1) Results are similar when the sample is restricted to
societies that earn at least half their subsistence from agriculture. 2) Results are similar
when dummies for ecological type are excluded. 3) Results are similar when estimated
only on the Ivory Coast.
A.3. Inequality. 1) The correlation between country-level inequality in a woman’s prime
marriageable years and polygamy is small or nonexistent. 2) Results using cluster and
region wealth Gini coefficients are similar to the baseline results. 3) A binary indicator
of historical class stratification gives similar results to the baseline.
A.4. Female education. There is only a small (though robust) correlation between years
of schooling and polygamy.
A.5. Economic growth. 1) Results are robust to including terms of trade as a control. 2)
Results are similar when estimated on the sample of non-migrants.
A.6. Economic shocks. Results are similar when estimated on the sample of non-migrants.
A.7. War. 1) Results are stronger when rainfall shocks are included. 2) Results are simi-
lar when estimated on the sample of non-migrants.
A.8. Child mortality. 1) Results are similar when using an alternative measure of child
mortality from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation. 2) Results are similar
when using an alternative measure of child mortality for sub-national regions com-
puted using the birth histories section of the DHS. 3) Results are similar when estimated
on the sample of non-migrants. 4) Results are robust to including log GDP per capita as
a control.
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A.9. Other hypotheses not discussed in the text. I include religion as a control, but
do not attempt to explain whether it has a causal impact. I discuss the correlation of
religion and polygamy in the Web Appendix. I have tested whether additional time-
invariant variables predict polygamy using (1). Polygamy and bride price recorded in
the Ethnographic Atlas both predict polygamy. A quadratic function of historic popula-
tion density gives an inverse-U pattern. This is consistent with many hypotheses. Baker
et al. (2008), for example, argue that inequality is highest at intermediate population
densities. The ratio of people to land may also reflect the cost of allocating farms across
wives (Goody, 1976).
I have tested whether additional time-varying variables predict polygamy using (2). I
have found no impact of urbanization or life expectancy. The urbanization rate in Africa
has risen some 25 percentage points over the past six decades (Christiaensen et al.,
2013), and there is a gap in polygamy rates between rural and urban areas of roughly
8 percentage points. Were this causal, it would imply only a 2 percentage point drop
in African polygamy. Further, polygamy is not declining fastest where urbanization is
increasing most rapidly.
There is no significant correlation between the rate of population growth in a woman’s
year of marriage and the probability she is polygamous. Literacy rates are, surprisingly,
positive predictors of polygamy. The Vanhanen (2000) index of democracy does not
predict polygamy. Like GDP, the Human Development Index predicts less polygamy,
though this recently-created index is missing for more than half the sample. The cor-
relation between polygamy and women’s labor force participation is negative, but not
robust. I do not have data on wages or the value of time of mothers or fathers.
There is a negative correlation if population growth is measured over a woman’s ado-
lescence. Similarly, higher country-level fertility rates in a woman’s year of marriage
or averaged over her adolescence predict lower rates of polygamy. Although standard
models (e.g. Tertilt (2005)) predict that population growth facilitates polygamy, these
results are interpretable if wives and births per wife are substitutes in producing births.
Further supporting this interpretation, both maternal mortality and adult female mor-
tality predict greater rates of polygamy.
Mean s.d. Min. Max. N Mean s.d. Min. Max. N
Main controls The gender division of labor
Polygamous 0.28 0.45 0 1 494,157 Historic female agriculture 2.91 0.89 1 5 207,757
Age 30.8 8.70 10 64 494,157 Inequality
Urban 0.30 0.46 0 1 494,157 Cluster c.v. of wealth index 2.95 39.2 0 3,721 241,709
Year of birth 1,970 10.5 1,937 1,994 494,157 Region c.v. of wealth index 15.1 148 0.22 3,199 240,656
Religion: Animist 0.0071 0.084 0 1 494,157 Historic class stratification 3.20 1.39 1 5 219,474
Religion: Catholic 0.17 0.37 0 1 494,157 Log wheat sugar ratio -1.04 0.68 -2.08 1.61 297,936
Religion: Christian (Other) 0.025 0.16 0 1 494,157 Region c.v. of ag. constraints. 0.18 0.064 0 0.39 301,183
Religion: Missing 0.093 0.29 0 1 494,157 The slave trade
Religion: None 0.044 0.21 0 1 494,157 ln(1+Atlantic slaves/Area), by name 0.62 0.99 0 3.66 259,012
Religion: Orthodox 0.016 0.12 0 1 494,157 Dist. Atlantic ST by name 5,818 1,531 3,694 9,258 259,012
Religion: Other 0.096 0.29 0 1 494,157 ln(1+Atlantic slaves/Area), by location 0.45 0.84 0 3.77 301,183
Religion: Protestant 0.19 0.39 0 1 494,157 Dist. Atlantic ST by location 6,143 1,719 3,702 9,534 301,183
Religion: Spiritual 0.0036 0.060 0 1 494,157 Female education
Religion: Traditional 0.025 0.16 0 1 494,157 Resp. Education Years 3.27 4.06 0 26 493,829
Religion: Muslim (excluded) 0.34 0.47 0 1 494,157 High intensity 0.85 0.36 0 1 35,513
Ecological zones Funds/capita (1953 pop.) 92.3 53.0 1.40 220 35,513
Woodland 0.22 0.42 0 1 301,183 Funds/capita (1976 pop.) 1.77 1.32 0.15 6.19 35,513
Forest 0.061 0.24 0 1 301,183 Teachers/cap (1925) 0.00046 0.0022 4.3e-06 0.024 103,432
Mosaics 0.15 0.35 0 1 301,183 Distance to Catholic Mission (000 km) 0.21 0.20 0.00015 1.17 301,183
Cropland 0.12 0.33 0 1 301,183 Distance to Protestant Mission (000 km) 0.17 0.19 0.00010 1.22 301,183
Intensive cropland 0.0011 0.033 0 1 301,183 Economic growth
Wetland 0.0084 0.091 0 1 301,183 Ln GDP per capita: Age of marriage 5.73 0.70 -3.85 9.06 448,195
Desert/Bare 0.034 0.18 0 1 301,183 Ln GDP per capita: Ages 12-16 5.72 0.71 -3.84 8.79 422,763
Water/Coastal fringe 0.041 0.20 0 1 301,183 GPCP Rain: Age of marriage 1,000 437 122 2,588 335,661
Urban 0.0070 0.083 0 1 301,183 CPCP Rain: Ages 12-16 1,014 429 181 2,376 275,863
Other GIS controls Economic shocks
Malaria 0.38 0.19 0 0.75 301,183 Rainfall shock: Age of marriage 0.95 0.19 0 8.06 252,079
Elevation 165 10.3 140 195 301,183 Rainfall shock: Ages 12-16 0.95 0.11 0 2.97 268,381
Ruggedness 64,300 102,512 0 1.37e+06 301,183 War
Distance to coast 463 358 0.013 1,771 301,183 Battle deaths: Age of marriage (millions) 0.0011 0.0050 0 0.12 300,669
Abs. latitude 10.7 5.18 0.0015 28.7 301,183 Battle deaths Ages 12-16 (millions) 0.0012 0.0037 0 0.033 300,390
Crop suitability Battle deaths: Age of marriage (nonzero) 0.0072 0.011 0.000020 0.12 47,572
Wheat suit. 0.42 1.05 0 7 298,017 Battle deaths Ages 12-16 (nonzero) 0.0044 0.0063 4.0e-06 0.033 78,118
Maize suit. 2.02 1.74 0 7 301,183 Child mortality
Cereals suit. 3.26 1.73 0 7 299,111 Child mortality: Ages of marriage 0.19 0.059 0.054 0.42 474,759
Roots and tubers suit. 2.04 1.68 0 7 301,183 Child mortality: Ages 12-16 0.20 0.058 0.057 0.40 456,573
Pulses suit. 2.43 1.61 0 7 299,111
Sugar suit. 2.88 1.60 0 7 299,111
Oil suit. 0.83 1.14 0 7 299,111
Cotton suit. 1.64 1.70 0 7 299,127
Rainfed ag. suit. 4.08 2.06 0 7 299,111
Table 1. Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Historic female agriculture -0.065*** -0.032*** -0.091*** -0.035*** -0.145*** -0.200**
(0.021) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.031) (0.086)
Wheat suit. -0.070*** -0.003** -0.064*** -0.005 0.287*** 0.014
(0.002) (0.001) (0.014) (0.004) (0.063) (0.021)
Maize suit. 0.005** 0.007*** 0.019** 0.008** -0.015 -0.010
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.038) (0.016)
Cereals suit. 0.021*** -0.004** -0.006 -0.005* -0.100** 0.016
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.044) (0.020)
Roots and tubers suit. -0.003* -0.005*** -0.013* -0.005 0.112*** 0.020
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.035) (0.021)
Pulses suit. -0.009*** 0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.038 -0.015
(0.003) (0.002) (0.010) (0.005) (0.057) (0.015)
Sugar suit. 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.015* 0.009* 0.002 -0.037**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.042) (0.018)
Oil suit. -0.030*** 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.218*** 0.047**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.005) (0.062) (0.021)
Cotton suit. 0.004* 0.000 0.006 -0.002 0.043 0.010
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.039) (0.009)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV
Observations 297,959 297,959 139,499 139,499 207,757 140,044 139,499 139,499 139,499 139,499
Other controls None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind.
F.E. None Cntry-rnd None Cntry-rnd None Cntry-rnd None Cntry-rnd None Cntry-rnd
Clustering Cluster Cluster E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic.
F test 10.65 1.792
Excluded instrument(s) Crop. Suit. Crop. Suit.
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Geographic controls (Geo.) are absolute latitude, suitability for rain-fed agriculture, malaria endemism,
ruggedness, elevation, distance to coast, and ecological zone. Individual controls (Ind.) are year of birth, year of birth squared, religious dummies, age, age squared, and urban.
Table 2. The gender division of labor
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Dependent variable: 
Polygamous
Dependent variable: 
Historic female 
agriculture
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Cluster wealth c.v. 0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Region wealth c.v. -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Historic class stratification 0.031*** 0.019*** 0.012**
(0.012) (0.007) (0.005)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 241,709 168,348 240,656 168,363 219,474 148,789 148,789
Other controls None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind.
F.E. Cntry-rnd Cntry-rnd Cntry-rnd Cntry-rnd None None Cntry-rnd
Clustering Cluster Cluster Region Region E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic. E.A. Ethnic.
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Log wheat sugar ratio -0.116*** -0.045*** -0.017***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Region c.v. of ag. constraints. 0.373*** 0.002 0.200***
(0.107) (0.067) (0.064)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 297,959 297,959 297,959 301,183 299,111 299,111
Other controls None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind. None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind.
F.E. None None Cntry-rnd None None Cntry-rnd
Clustering Cluster Cluster Cluster Region Region Region
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Table 3. Inequality
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Geographic controls (Geo.) are absolute latitude, suitability for rain-fed agriculture, malaria
endemism, ruggedness, elevation, distance to coast, and ecological zone. Individual controls (Ind.) are year of birth, year of birth squared, religious dummies, age, age
squared, and urban.
Dependent variable: Polygamous
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
ln(1+Atl. slaves/Area), by location 0.043*** 0.024** -0.008 0.008 -0.005 0.028** 0.019* -0.011*
(0.014) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.005)
ln(1+Atl. slaves/Area), by name 0.025* 0.006 -0.001
(0.013) (0.011) (0.007)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 301,183 299,111 299,111 299,111 170,674 259,012 169,262 169,262 291,060 288,871 288,871
Sample Full Full Full Full W. Africa Full Full Full Full Full Full
Other controls None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind. Longitude None None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind. None Geo. Geo.
F.E. None None Cntry-rnd None None None None Cntry-rnd None None Cntry-rnd
Clustering
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
name)
Ethnicity (by 
name)
Ethnicity (by 
name)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
(12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)
ln(1+Atl. slaves/Area), by location 0.429*** 0.360*** -0.068*** -0.107** -0.075* 0.310*** 0.415*** -0.041**
(0.108) (0.102) (0.024) (0.044) (0.044) (0.076) (0.135) (0.018)
ln(1+Atl. slaves/Area), by name 0.300*** 0.373* -0.035
(0.084) (0.195) (0.029)
Estimator IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Observations 301,183 299,111 299,111 301,183 170,674 259,012 169,262 169,262 291,060 288,871 288,871
Sample Full Full Full Full W. Africa Full Full Full Full Full Full
Other controls None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind. Longitude None None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind. None Geo. Geo.
F.E. None None Cntry-rnd None None None None Cntry-rnd None None Cntry-rnd
Clustering
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
name)
Ethnicity (by 
name)
Ethnicity (by 
name)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
Ethnicity (by 
loc.)
F test 17.87 16.27 18.18 13.50 9.891 15.35 5.513 13.88 18.90 11.52 17.97
Excluded instrument(s) ST distance ST distance Coast dist. ST distance ST distance ST distance ST distance Coast dist. ST distance ST distance Coast dist.
Table 4. The slave trade
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Geographic controls (Geo.) are absolute latitude, suitability for rain-fed agriculture, malaria endemism, ruggedness, elevation, distance to coast, and
ecological zone. Individual controls (Ind.) are year of birth, year of birth squared, religious dummies, age, age squared, and urban.
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Individual recode Household recode
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Individual recode Household recode
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Born 1970-75 X Intensity 0.048* 0.000 -0.012 14 or below in 1980 -0.008 -0.001
(0.025) (0.000) (0.008) (0.020) (0.025)
Born 1970-75 -0.108*** -0.095** -0.043 Age in 1980 0.002 0.003
(0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.003) (0.005)
Intensity -0.004 0.000 -0.019*** (14-Age in 1980) -0.002 -0.004
(0.054) (0.000) (0.006)      X Below 14 in 1980 (0.004) (0.008)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS Estimator OLS OLS
Sample Sample Zimb. "Full" Zimb. "Short"
Measure of intensity
High / low
Dollars / 1953 
pop.
Dollars / 1976 
pop. Ages in 1980 6 to 22 10 to 20
Observations 9,668 9,668 9,668 Observations 6,367 3,901
Other controls Osili/Long Osili/Long Osili/Long Other controls No No
F.E. None None None F.E. None None
Clustering 1976 State 1976 State 1976 State Clustering Robust Robust
Dep. Var.: PolygamousDep. Var.: Polygamous
Nigerians b. 1970-75 and 1956-61.
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Osili/Long controls are year of birth, and dummies for the three largest Nigerian
ethnic groups (Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo), and the major religions (Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, other Christian, and traditional). 
Table 5. Modern education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Teachers/capita, 1910-1928 -7.227*** -5.175*** -9.197*** -9.195*** -4.166**
(1.314) (1.834) (2.245) (3.255) (1.974)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample
Observations 103,432 103,432 103,432 103,432 103,432
F.E. None None None None None
Other controls None Attractiveness Conquest Precolonial H-Geographic
Clustering District 1925 District 1925 District 1925 District 1925 District 1925
(6) (7) (8) (9)
Distance to Catholic mission 0.191*** 0.064*** 0.052*** 0.156***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.025)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 301,183 299,111 299,111 299,111
Other controls None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind. Ind.
F.E. None None Cntry-rnd Region
Clustering Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
(10) (11) (12) (13)
Distance to Protestant mission 0.233*** -0.003 -0.087*** 0.015
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.025)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 301,183 299,111 299,111 299,111
Other controls None Geo./Ind. Geo./Ind. Ind.
F.E. None None Cntry-rnd Region
Clustering Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Geographic controls (Geo.) are absolute latitude, suitability for rain-fed
agriculture, malaria endemism, ruggedness, elevation, distance to coast, and ecological zone. Individual controls (Ind.) are year of birth, year of birth
squared, religious dummies, age, age squared, and urban. Attractiveness controls are trade taxes in 1914. Conquest controls are date of conquest,
length of resistence and its square, and indemnities in 1910. Precolonial controls are the presence of an ancient state, the presence of a European
trade counter, and 1925 population density. H-Geographic controls are latitude, longitude, altitude, dummies for the river and coast, and average
rainfall from 1915 to 1975.
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Table 6. Colonial education
French West Africa
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Shock Rainfall Battle deaths Child mort. (WDI)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Shock at age of marriage -0.015*** -0.201*** -0.025*** 0.238 0.736***
(0.004) (0.074) (0.004) (0.153) (0.074)
Estimator OLS IV OLS OLS OLS
Observations 448,195 318,119 252,079 300,669 474,759
Other controls Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual
FE Y.O.M./Cluster Y.O.M./Cluster Y.O.M./Cluster Y.O.M./Cluster Y.O.M./Cluster
Clustering Country x Y.O.M. Country x Y.O.M. Cluster x Y.O.M. Cluster x Y.O.M. Country x Y.O.M.
F test 8.855
Excluded instrument(s) GPCP Rainfall
Shock Rainfall Battle deaths Child mort. (WDI)
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Shock over ages 12-16 -0.014*** -0.257** -0.040*** 1.088*** 0.987***
(0.005) (0.119) (0.008) (0.220) (0.083)
Estimator OLS IV OLS OLS OLS
Observations 422,763 253,662 268,381 300,390 456,573
Other controls Religion Religion Religion Religion Religion
FE Y.O.B./Cluster Y.O.B./Cluster Y.O.B./Cluster Y.O.B./Cluster Y.O.B./Cluster
Clustering Country x Y.O.M. Country x Y.O.M. Cluster x Y.O.M. Cluster x Y.O.M. Country x Y.O.M.
F test 6.265
Excluded instrument(s) GPCP Rainfall
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Geographic controls (Geo.) are absolute latitude, suitability for rain-fed agriculture,
malaria endemism, ruggedness, elevation, distance to coast, and ecological zone. Individual controls (Ind.) are year of birth, year of birth squared,
religious dummies, age, age squared, and urban.
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Table 7. Time-varying determinants of polygamy
Ln(GDP per capita)
Dependent variable: Polygamous
Ln(GDP per capita)
Benin and 
Burkina Faso
Benin and 
Niger
Benin and 
Nigeria
Benin and 
Togo
Burkina Faso 
and Ghana
Burkina Faso 
and Ivory 
Coast
Burkina Faso 
and Niger
Burkina Faso 
and Mali
Burkina Faso 
and Togo
CAR and 
Cameroon CAR and DRC
Cameroon and 
Nigeria
DRC and 
Rwanda
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Border 0.867* 0.092 0.051 0.029 0.067 0.089 0.082 -0.023 0.048 0.189* -0.726* -0.201** 0.000
(0.444) (0.086) (0.148) (0.053) (0.075) (0.143) (0.115) (0.076) (0.116) (0.095) (0.396) (0.095) (0.000)
Obs 1,605 1,375 9,217 14,855 5,503 1,803 3,857 11,148 2,603 1,255 1,924 7,198 5,359
DRC and 
Tanzania
DRC and 
Uganda
DRC and 
Zambia
Ethiopia and 
Kenya
Ghana and 
Ivory Coast
Ghana and 
Togo
Guinea and 
Ivory Coast
Guinea and 
Liberia
Guinea and 
Mali
Guinea and 
Senegal
Ivory Coast 
and Liberia
Ivory Coast 
and Mali
Kenya and 
Tanzania
(14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26)
Border -4.381 -0.134 -0.033 0.135 -0.049 -0.009 0.095 -0.006 0.144 -0.169 -0.130** 0.243 0.106
(8.703) (0.174) (0.043) (0.138) (0.077) (0.041) (0.408) (0.070) (0.118) (0.186) (0.059) (0.150) (0.142)
Obs 887 3,210 1,665 470 3,957 11,518 2,145 4,458 4,628 2,126 4,000 3,380 4,639
Kenya and 
Uganda
Malawi and 
Mozambique
Malawi and 
Tanzania
Malawi and 
Zambia Mali and Niger
Mali and 
Senegal
Mozambique 
and Tanzania
Mozambique 
and Zambia
Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe
Niger and 
Nigeria
Rwanda and 
Tanzania
Rwanda and 
Uganda
Zambia and 
Zimbabwe
(27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39)
Border -0.099 0.040 0.158*** -0.000 0.301 0.093 -4.497 0.000 -0.106 -0.125** 0.026 -0.043 0.049
(0.085) (0.061) (0.060) (0.064) (0.213) (0.096) (2.932) (0.000) (0.210) (0.061) (0.066) (0.043) (0.110)
Obs 3,793 16,673 2,919 7,019 887 2,208 1,592 574 2,885 12,252 4,064 5,284 1,629
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS, with polygyny as the dependent variable and standard errors clustered at the survey cluster level. Other controls are a cubic in distance to the
border, interacted with a country dummy, year of birth, year of birth squared, religious dummies, age, age squared, and urban. The coefficient reflects the jump from moving to the alphabetically prior country. 
Table 8. National borders
DHS IPUMS
(1) (2)
Kigezi X Post (birth) -0.074** -0.007**
(0.035) (0.003)
Estimator OLS OLS
Observations 8,740 182,553
Other controls Rel/Urb/Eth Rel/Urb/Eth
F.E. Y.O.B./Dist. Y.O.B./Dist.
Clustering District District
Table 9. Malaria eradication in Uganda
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Sample
only includes Uganda. Rel/Urb/Eth signifies controls for religion, urban, and
ethnicity.
Dependent variable: Polygamous
